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acknowledged that the unique problems that drunk driving presents to law
enforcement and the states, due to the fleeting nature of evidence of
bodily alcohol content, support a finding of exigent circumstances. The
exigent circumstances justify a warrantless search for evidence, and the
best means of obtaining this evidence is the breathalyzer test. Because
defendants were pulled over consistent with individualized determinations
of suspicion, the limited intrusions that breathalyzer tests impose are
justified by the tests' ability to prevent the destruction of evidence. Relying
on both exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that the breathalyzer tests
imposed on Reid and Boylan were not unreasonable searches. The Fourth's
Circuit's decision is consistent with other courts' treatment of the issue
and with recent Supreme Court decisions granting greater latitude
to States
2
to respond to the national crisis posed by drunk driving.
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND SENTENCING

Section 1985(3), 42 U.S.C. § 1985(e) (1988) (section 1985(3)), is a
federal statute that provides relief against private conspiracies designed to
deprive any person or class of persons from equal protection of the laws.
Enacted in 1871, along with other Reconstruction Era civil rights statutes,
a primary purpose of section 1985(3) was to protect black citizens from
conspiratorial Ku Klux Klan activities. 3 In 1951, the Supreme Court
determined in Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), that the language
of section 1985(3) reached only conspiracies performed under the color of
state law. However, twenty years later, the Court held that in certain
contexts the statute could reach private conspiracies as well. In Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971), the Court stated that limiting the reach
of section 1985(3) solely to conspiracies involving state action was an
unnecessarily narrow construction of the statute.
In upholding the application of section 1985(3) in the private conspiracy context, the Griffin Court identified both the Thirteenth Amendment
and the constitutional right of interstate travel as sources of federal

12. See Michigan State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990) (upholding sobriety
check-points); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1981) (upholding police taking
blood sample without consent from hospitalized patient subsequent to involvement in auto
accident).
Other federal and state courts' treatment of the issue is consistent with the Fourth
Circuit's. See United States v. Berry, 866 F.2d 887, 890 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that blood
sample taken from unconscious defendant involved in auto accident was not obtained in
violation of Fourth Amendment); United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1988)
(upholding warrantless analysis of defendant's blood sample); Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp.
196, 199 (D.C.S.D. 1973) (holding that Fourth Amendment requires either lawful arrest or
exigent circumstances to exempt search from warrant requirement).
13. See generally Ken Gormley, Private Conspiracies and the Constitution: A Modern
Vision of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 64 TEx. L. REv. 527, 530-46 (1985) (outlining early
history of § 1985(3) and noting decade of disuse).
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legislative power giving Congress the authority to reach private conspiracies. According to Griffin, Congress' creation of a statutory cause of
action designed to remedy victims of "conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action" was well within Congress' powers under the Thirteenth
Amendment. The Court also determined that Congress was within its
power to protect the constitutional right of interstate travel from private
conspiracies because the Court had held in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969), that the Constitution protected the right to travel from
both governmental and private interference. However, the Griffin Court
left open the possibility of applying the statute to conspiracies centered
upon a class-based discrimination other than race. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed a more modern and controversial application of section 1985(3) in NOW v. Operation Rescue, 914
F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991), involving women seeking
abortions as the protected class and protestors blocking access to abortion
clinics as the private conspirators.
In NOW, the plaintiff National Organization For Women (NOW),
along with various abortion clinics, alleged that the defendant Operation
Rescue and its supporters engaged in conspiratorial activities designed to
infringe upon a woman's right to obtain an abortion and her right to
interstate travel. NOW asserted that Operation Rescue had violated the
constitutional right to interstate travel because some of the patients who
were unable to gain access to the abortion clinics, due to Operation
Rescue's demonstrations, were from out of state. NOW is an organization
whose main concern is the preservation of a woman's right to have an
abortion, while Operation Rescue is an association whose main goals
include both the prevention and eventual illegalization of abortions. Operation Rescue demonstrations are designed to shut abortion clinics down
by blockading the clinics' entrances and exits in order to effectively prevent
abortions.
In anticipation of Operation Rescue demonstrations, NOW successfully
obtained from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, a temporary restraining order protecting Northern Virginia from
abortion clinic blockades allegedly scheduled for November 1989. Although
Operation Rescue did not demonstrate in Northern Virginia during that
time, clinics located in Maryland and the District of Columbia did shut
down because of the organization's activities in those areas. NOW then
applied for a permanent injunction, and the court consolidated the hearing
on the application for injunctive relief and the trial of action on the
merits. After a two day proceeding, in which Operation Rescue chose not
to testify, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia granted a permanent injunction enjoining Operation Rescue and
six other individuals from blockading patients' access to abortion clinics
pursuant to section 1985(3) and the constitutional right to interstate travel.
As a prerequisite to issuing the injunctive relief, the district court ruled
that section 1985(3) did encompass women seeking abortions as a class
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protected from conspiracies designed to infringe upon their constitutional
right to interstate travel.
Initially the district court outlined the essential elements of a section
1985(3) claim-evidence of a harmful or injurious act, done in furtherance
of a conspiracy, designed to deprive either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of equal protection of the laws or equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. The district court determined
that section 1985(3) does encompass gender-based discriminatory animus
because a gender-based class possesses certain distinct and immutable
characteristics comparable to race-based or national origin-based classes.
The district court further reasoned that members of NOW and abortion
clinic patients qualified as a valid subset of the gender-based class. The
district court, relying on Griffin, next observed that because the Constitution protects the right to interstate travel from both governmental and
private interference, NOW did not need to present evidence of state action
in order to make out a section 1985(3) claim. The district court concluded
that the issuance of permanent injunctive relief in favor of NOW was
appropriate because of the equities involved in the case.
However, in granting the specific relief, the district court refused to
extend the injunction nationwide or to include restrictions on Operation
Rescue's expressive activities, concluding that both requests were overly
broad. The district court pointed to the significant First Amendment rights
protecting Operation Rescue's expressive tactics. Furthermore, the district
court found it unnecessary to rule on NOW's contention that in addition
to protecting the right to interstate travel, section 1985(3) also protected
the fundamental right to have an abortion. The district court explained
that, because the right to travel provided the district court with an
independent means for granting the requested relief, there was no reason
to rule on the alternative grounds suggested by NOW. Operation Rescue
appealed the district court's decision granting the permanent injunctionwhile NOW cross-appealed, specifically questioning the district court's
refusal to extend the scope of the permanent injunction.
In rejecting both appeals and upholding the district court's decision
in full, the Fourth Circuit, relying upon Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240
(4th Cir. 1985), agreed that gender-based class animus satisfied the animus
requirement of section 1985(3). Buschi explicitly identified classes based
on sex, along with race and national origin, as classes afforded section
1985(3) protection. The NOW court stated that affirmance of the district
court's ruling was proper because Operation Rescue had overstepped
permissible free speech grounds by physically blockading abortion clinics.
The NOW court, applying an abuse of discretion standard, examined
the entry, scope and duration of the district court's injunction. The court
was unable to conclude that the entry, scope or duration of the permanent
injunction was an abuse of the district court's discretion. Specifically, the
court rejected the contention that the district court should have broadened
the reach of the injunction by extending it indefinitely instead of limiting
the geographically-protected area to Northern Virginia. Also, the Fourth
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Circuit explicitly affirmed the district court's decision not to restrain
Operation Rescue members from activities designed to intimidate and
harass clinic patients. Applying a balancing test, the NOW court noted
that because such actions were clearly protected by the First Amendment,
the district court properly refused to enjoin Operation Rescue's expressive
activities. Finally, the Fourth Circuit refused to address NOW's contention
that section 1985(3) protects a woman's right to have an abortion.
Although the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's determinations
that gender-based animus satisfies the class-based animus requirement of
section 1985(3) and that NOW's members and clinic patients constituted
a valid subset of a gender-based class, not all jurisdictions have drawn
the same conclusion. For instance, in Lewis v. Pearson Foundation, Inc.,
908 F.2d 318, 324-25 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 917 F.2d 1077, petition for
cert. filed, 59 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Apr. 23, 1991) (No. 90-1575), the
Eighth Circuit, upon rehearing en banc, vacated a previous determination
that section 1985(3) protected women seeking abortions from conspiratorial
activities. Comparably in Roe v. Abortion Abolition Society, 811 F.2d
931, 934-37 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987), the Fifth Circuit
reasoned that patients, doctors, abortion clinics and staff that defined
themselves as a group of people in disagreement with the defendant's
point of view on abortion did not constitute a valid protected class under
section 1985(3) because the class was over-inclusive. A few years later, in
Mississippi Women's Medical Clinic v. McMillan, 866 F.2d 788, 793-94
(5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit concluded that a class defined as women
of childbearing age seeking medical attention was too under-inclusive to
warrant protection under section 1985(3). Similarly, in National Abortion
Federation v. Operation Rescue, 721 F. Supp. 1168, 1170 (C.D. Cal.
1989), the United States District Court for the Central District of California
concluded that women seeking abortions did not constitute a protected
class under the language of section 1985(3). However, the Fourth Circuit's
determination in NOW is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions
addressing the issue of whether section 1985(3) encompasses gender-based
conspiratorial discrimination.' 4 Furthermore, in finding that Operation
Rescue conspiratorially violated abortion clinic patients' right to interstate
travel and in issuing the permanent injunction, the Fourth Circuit's opinion

14. See Volunteer Medical Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 224-25 (6th
Cir. 1991) (finding that women constitute cognizable class under § 1985(3)); NOW v. Terry,
886 F.2d 1339, 1355-59 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that women qualify as valid protected class
under § 1985(3)), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990); Volk v. Coler, 845 F.2d 1422, 1434
(7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that § 1985(3) encompasses conspiratorial discrimination based
upon sex); Stathos v. Bowden, 728 F.2d 15, 20-21 (Ist Cir. 1984) (applying § 1985(3) to award
damages in sexual discrimination case); Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d 499,
505 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that legislative history of § 1985(3) supports extending application
of statute to women); Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235,
1243-44 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that conspiratorial discrimination based upon sex actionable
under § 1985(3)), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
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parallels the Second Circuit's analysis in NOW v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339
(2nd. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2206 (1990).
Many federal defendants spend time under court-imposed conditions
of release, in lieu of incarceration. Conditions of release may severely
restrict liberty, as when a court conditions release on confinement in a
residential drug treatment center. Prisoners will often seek to have that
time credited against their sentences.
A prisoner's claim for sentence credit is a matter of sentence administration, which is under the authority of the Bureau of Prisons and the
Attorney General. The prisoner must first bring his claim to the Bureau
of Prisons.' 5 If the prisoner is not satisfied with the outcome, he may
seek judicial intervention by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus in
the district where he is incarcerated.
Two statutes control whether presentence time counts against a sentence. Title 18 U.S.C section 3585, which applies when the prisoner
committed his offense on or after November 1, 1987, provides: "A
defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the
sentence commences-(1) As a result of the offense for which the sentence
was imposed[.]" Title 18 U.S.C. section 3568, which applies when the
prisoner committed his offense prior to November 1, 1987, provides:
The Attorney General shall give any ... person credit toward
service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in connection
with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed[.]
If any such person shall be committed to a jail or other place of
detention to await transportation to the place at which his sentence
is to be served, his sentence shall commence to run from the date
on which he is received at such jail of other place of detention.
Most circuits have held that the terms "official detention" in section
3585 and "custody" in section 3568 are equivalent. 16 However, the circuits
differ on what kind of presentence restrictions rise to the level of official

15. Courts generally require that prisoners exhaust administrative remedies in sentence
credit cases. See United States v. Bayless, 940 F.2d 300, 305 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that issue
of sentence credit was not properly before court when defendant had not presented claim to
Attorney General); United States v Herrera, 931 F.2d 761, 764 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that
district court lacked jurisdiction over claim for sentence credit because defendant had not
exhausted administrative remedies). But see Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that court has power to hear claim for sentence credit before defendant exhausts
administrative remedies because exhaustion is judicially created, not statutory, restriction).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Zackular, No. 91-1482, 1991 WL 186667 (1st Cir. Sept.
24, 1991) (construing terms "custody" in 18 U.S.C. § 3568 and "official detention" in 18
U.S.C. § 3585 as equivalent); Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522, 524 n.1 (4th Cir. 1991)
(same); Moreland v. United States, 932 F.2d 690, 692 n.4 (8th Cir. 1991) (same); Insley v.
United States 927 F.2d 185, 186 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d
653, 654-55 (10th Cir. 1989) (same).
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detention or custody. The Fourth Circuit considered the issue of when to
grant credit for presentence time in United States v. Insley, 927 F.2d 185
(4th Cir. 1991) and Randall v. Whelan, 938 F.2d 522 (4th Cir. 1991).
In Insley the defendant Insley sought credit for time spent on appeal
bond. Insley argued that the conditions of her release on bond were
sufficiently restrictive to constitute official detention under section 3585.
The conditions of Insley's release required her to (1) seek employment,
(2) reside with her parents, (3) leave her residence only to seek employment,
work, or attend church, (4) regularly report to the United States Probation
Office, (5) be at home no later than 9:00 p.m., (6) execute a bond, (7)
be electronically monitored at her own expense, (8) submit to random
drug testing, and (9) stay in touch with her attorney. The United States
District Court for South Carolina refused to grant credit, and Insley
appealed.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The Insley court held that the term
"official detention" in section 3585 means imprisonment. The Fourth
Circuit cited eleven cases from other courts denying credit for time spent
on bond under a variety of conditions. The Fourth Circuit rejected Insley's
attempt to broaden the meanings of the terms "official detention" and
"custody" by relying on their meanings in other contexts. The Insley
court also rejected the approach of two cases where other circuits had
granted credit for time on bond under restrictive conditions. In Brown v.
Rison, 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990), the Ninth Circuit granted credit for
time spent at a residential community treatment center. In Johnson v.
Smith, 696 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit granted credit
for time spent in a federal treatment center. However, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the conditions in Brown and Johnson were far more restrictive
than Insley's conditions.
In Randall the defendant Randall sought credit for time spent before
and after sentencing at a residential drug rehabilitation center. In January
1986, the trial court released Randall before trial on condition that he
remain confined at the drug rehabilitation center at all times except for
court appearances and meetings with counsel. On May 2, 1986, Randall
pled guilty under a plea agreement. The government asked the trial court
to delay sentencing while Randall completed his obligations under the plea
agreement. At Randall's request the trial court imposed sentence on July
31, but delayed for sixty days Randall's obligation to report to a federal
penitentiary. The trial court reasoned that during the sixty days, Randall
could testify for the government at an upcoming trial and could continue
drug treatment. Randall had requested the delay, and the government did
not object. On July 31, the trial court issued two orders. The first order
commanded Randall into the custody of the Attorney General and imposed
sentence. The second order required Randall to surrender at a prison on
October 1, 1986, in accordance with instructions from the United States
Marshal, but that in the meantime, Randall was to be detained twentyfour hours a day at the drug rehabilitation center.
Several years later Randall petitioned the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus after the Bureau of Prisons
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refused to give him sentence credit for his time at the drug rehabilitation
center. Randall argued Insley did not create a bright line rule but rather
held that decisions regarding sentence credit must rest on the severity of
the restrictions. Randall argued that a Bureau of Prisons policy statement
identified the degree of restraint as the critical factor in deciding whether
to give sentence credit under section 3568, and asked the district court to
find that the severe restrictions of his confinement for drug rehabilitation
justified an award of sentence credit. The district court, relying on Insley,
denied the petition, and Randall appealed.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Relying on Insley, the Randall court
stated that conditions of release do not constitute "custody" within the
meaning of section 3568. The Fourth Circuit rejected Randall's reading
of the Bureau of Prisons policy statement because in the policy statement
the Bureau of Prisons had clearly stated that a prisoner may not receive
sentence credit for time spent in a residential community center as a
condition of bail or bond. The Randall court gave deference to the Bureau
of Prisons as an expert agency drawing a reasonable interpretation of a
statute. The Fourth Circuit said that whether a person is in custody
depends not on the degree of restraint, but rather on the legal authority
of the custodian. A person not under the authority of the Attorney General
is not in "custody" within the meaning of section 3568, the Randall court
said.
The Fourth Circuit also said that Randall's situation was not covered
by the second paragraph of section 3568 allowing credit for time committed
to a jail or other place of detention to await transportation to where the
prisoner will serve his sentence. The Randall court reasoned that this
paragraph did not apply because Randall had asked to return to the
rehabilitation center, the trial court and not the Attorney General had
directed him to go there, and the situation was identical to that in Insley
where the Fourth Circuit had refused credit for time on bond pending
appeal.
The Randall court also said that using the degree of restraint as a test
of custody would mire the judiciary in circumstantial details and lead to
inconsistent results. Finally, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that denial of
credit was not unfair because the Bureau of Prisons policy was longstanding, and therefore Randall should have known that he would not get
sentence credit for time spent at the rehabilitation center.
A partial dissent in Randall objected to the majority's denial of credit
for the sixty days that Randall had spent in the rehabilitation center after
sentencing. The dissent argued that the sentencing order, by express
language, committed Randall to the custody of the Attorney General.
Furthermore, Randall's subsequent confinement satisfied the requirements
of the second paragraph of section 3568, the dissent noted, because Randall
was convicted, was in the legal custody of the Attorney General, was
subject to orders of the United States Marshal regarding transportation
to prison, and was in a place of detention.
The Fourth Circuit is in agreement with most other circuits that
conditions of bond, no matter how restrictive, do not qualify for sentence
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credit under section 3585 or section 3568.17 However, a few circuits have
granted sentence credit for time outside official incarceration. In Johnson
v. Smith, 629 F.2d 1334 (lth Cir. 1983), the Eleventh Circuit granted
credit for time spent in a federal community treatment center, holding
that to deny credit to presentence residents while granting credit to
postsentence residents was a violation of due process.18 The Ninth Circuit
in Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990), granted credit for time
on pretrial release under conditions imposing enrollment at a treatment
facility, curfew, restrictions on contacts, and random drug testing. The
Brown court reasoned that the restrictions on the defendant's freedom
were comparable to incarceration. In Moreland v. United States, 932 F.2d
690 (8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit followed Brown, granting credit

for time on bond under restrictive conditions at a halfway house.
The Fourth Circuit's denial of credit in Randall for time after sentencing while in the legal custody of the Attorney General is singular. The
Randall opinion is difficult to interpret because, on the one hand, the

17. See United States v. Freeman, 922 F.2d 1393, 1396-98 (9th Cir. 1991) (denying credit
for time spent on probation or release on bond pending appeal); Mieles v. United States, 895
F.2d 887, 888 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying credit for pretrial release on bond and holding that
credit requires physical confinement); United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653, 656 (10th Cir.
1989) (denying credit for time spent on bond in residential treatment center and holding that
granting such credit to postsentence residents of center but not to presentence residents did
not violate equal protection); United States v. Carlson, 886 F.2d 166, 167 (8th Cir. 1989)
(denying credit for time spent on restricted bond); Ramsey v. Brennan, 878 F.2d 995, 996 (7th
Cir. 1989) (denying credit for time spent in halfway house before trial as condition of bail);
United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 835, 837 (5th Cir. 1989) (denying credit for time spent on
restricted bond, in medical care unit, or in halfway house); United States v. Mares, 868 F.2d
151, 152 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (denying credit for pretrial release on ball); United States
v. Figueroa, 828 F.2d 70, 71 (Ist Cir. 1987) (denying credit for pretrial time spent on conditional
release and holding that term "custody" in § 3568 means imprisonment); Marrera v. Edwards,
812 F.2d 1517, 1517 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying credit for time spent on bond and holding that
term "custody" in § 3568 requires physical incarceration); Villaume v. United States Dept. of
Justice, 804 F.2d 498, 499 (8th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (denying credit for pretrial time on
bond), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1022 (1987); United States v. Golden, 795 F.2d 19, 21 (3d Cir.
1986) (denying credit for time spent in witness protection program waiting for order to selfsurrender); Cerrella v. Hanberry, 650 F.2d 606, 607 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (denying
credit for time spent under restrictive bail conditions); United States v. Robles, 563 F.2d 1308,
1309 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (denying credit for time spent on restrictive bond), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978); Ortega v. United States, 510 F.2d 412, 413 (10th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam) (denying credit for time spent on bond and holding that term "custody" in § 3568
means incarceration); United States v. Peterson, 507 F.2d 1191, 1192-93 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (denying credit for time spent on conditional release pending appeal); Polakoff v.
United States, 489 F.2d 727, 730 (5th Cir. 1974) (denying credit for time spent on restrictive
bond); Sica v. United States, 454 F.2d 281, 282 (9th Cir. 1971) (denying credit for time released
on bail pending appeal); United States v. Rouco, 738 F. Supp. 172, 173 (W.D.N.C. 1990)
(holding that term "custody" in § 3568 means incarceration in official detention facility).
18. But see United States v. Woods, 888 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1989) (denying credit for
time spent on bond in residential treatment center and holding that granting such credit to
postsentence residents of center but not to presentence residents did not violate equal protection).
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Fourth Circuit says the term "custody" means legal custody, but on the
other hand, the Fourth circuit denies credit when a prisoner is in legal,
but not actual, custody. No other circuit court has denied a prisoner
sentence credit for time spent after sentencing while in the legal custody
of the Attorney General.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32 (Rule 32) places conditions upon
the use of witness depositions in trial proceedings. If a deposition is
admissible under the rules of evidence, it may be used at trial, subject to
certain limitations, as though the witness were present and testifying.
Prior to the revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in- 1970,
old Rule 26(a) provided that depositions could be taken for discovery
purposes, for use at trial, or for both purposes. Old Rule 26(d), which
preceded Rule 32(a) in governing the use of depositions at trial, noted the
distinction between discovery and evidentiary depositions. However, courts
did not distinguish between the two types of depositions when deciding
the admissibility of depositions at trial. 19 After the revision of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, the subject matter of old Rule 26(a) was
transferred to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a), while the subject
matter of old Rule 26(d) was transferred to Rule 32(a).
Today, Rule 30 lays out the ground rules for taking depositions
whereas Rule 32 addresses the use of depositions at trial. Neither rule
makes reference to a distinction between depositions taken for discovery
purposes and depositions taken for evidentiary purposes. The distinction
between the two types of depositions, which was noted in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure only prior to the 1970 revision, has not been
20
highlighted in circuit court or district court cases.
Currently, Rule 32(a)(3)(B) states that if a witness is located further
than 100 miles from the place of trial or is out of the United States, a
deposition of that witness is admissible during trial. However, if the party
opposing admission of the deposition can show that the absence of the
witness was caused by the party offering the deposition, the party offering
the deposition may not use it at trial. Rule 32(a)(3)(B) specifies that the
100 mile distance should be measured from the "place of trial." The term
"place of trial" has been used interchangeably with the word "courthouse"

19. See Wright Root Beer Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 414 F.2d 887, 889-91 (5th Cir. 1969)
(stating that depositions taken pretrial for purposes of discovery which were subject to crossexamination should have been admitted at trial when stipulations of Rule 26(d)(3) were met
and that jury instructions directing jury not to give discovery depositions any weight were
prejudicial and erroneous); Rosenthal v. People's Cab Co., 26 F.R.D. 116, 117 (W.D. Pa.
1960) (noting that Rule 26(d) does not distinguish between depositions taken solely for purposes
of discovery and depositions taken for use at trial and that court would not read restriction
into Rule which did not exist).
20. See Savoie v. Lafourche Boat Rentals, Inc., 627 F.2d 722, 724 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing
Rule 32 as basis for rejection of contention that discovery depositions may not be used at
trial against party who conducted them); United States v. International Business Machines
Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that Rule 32 makes no distinction between
discovery depositions and depositions taken for use at trial).
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in opinions by some courts. 2' However, the drafters of Rule 32(a)(3)(B)
did not indicate whether the "place of trial" is the district in which the
courthouse where trial is held sits, or the actual courthouse.
Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do include the direction to
measure a distance either from the courthouse or from the borders of the
district. For instance, Rule 45(e), which addresses service of process,
specifically mentions that the 100 mile radius limiting service of process
is to be measured from the place of trial. However, if a defendant is
within the district, even though farther than 100 miles away, the court
may issue service of process under Rule 45(e). Courts have contrasted the
specificity of the language in Rule 45(e) with the language in Rule 32 and
determined that the 100 mile radius in Rule 32(a)(3)(B) should be measured
from the
courthouse and should apply even if the party is within the
22
district .
In Tatman v. Collins, 938 F.2d 509 (4th Cir. 1991), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a deposition
taken for discovery purposes is admissible under Rule 32(a)(3)(B) and
whether the rule's 100 mile requirement should be measured from the
courthouse or from the borders of the district. The plaintiff, Rebecca
Tatman, brought suit for Monte L. Tatman, her deceased husband. A
tractor-trailer driven by the defendant Bobby Wayne Collins had struck
Mr. Tatman's automobile from the rear. Following the accident, Mr.
Tatman was treated by Dr. Joseph Amico for injuries to his neck, back,
shoulder and head. A year later, Mr. Tatman was hospitalized with a
cerebral aneurysm and died shortly thereafter.
Mr. Tatman's wife filed a wrongful death suit against the defendant
and Tatman's employer in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia. The complaint alleged that Mr. Tatman's death
was causally linked to the injuries sustained in the earlier accident. The
complaint further alleged that the accident caused the defendant's blood
pressure to rise and fall uncontrollably which, in turn, caused the aneurysm. In a deposition, Dr. Amico testified about the treatment given to
Mr. Tatman and opined that there was a causal connection between the
injuries sustained by Mr. Tatman in the accident and the subsequent
aneurysm. Because a scheduling conflict more than 100 miles from the
courthouse prevented Dr. Amico from coming to the trial, Mrs. Tatman's
attorney sought to introduce the doctor's earlier deposition testimony.
The district court excluded the deposition under Rule 32(a) because
the defendant had deposed the doctor early in the trial for discovery
21. See United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1339 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating that Rule 32

permits deposition of witness who is more than one hundred miles from courthouse); Starr v.
J. Hacker Co., 688 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1982) (using "courthouse" as site from which to

measure required 100 mile distance).
22. See United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 90 F.R.D. 377, 380

(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that 100 mile limitation in Rule 32(a)(3)(B) is not meant to correspond
to subpoena power under Rule 45(e) and that deposition of witness who is beyond 100 mile

limit but within district can be used at trial, although deponent is subject to subpoena power
of court).
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purposes, not specifically for use as evidence in the trial. The court also
concluded that the deposition could not be used under Rule 32(a)(3)(B)
because Amico's location at the time of trial was within 100 miles of the
northern border of the Southern District of West Virginia, although more
than 100 miles from the courthouse.
The only other witness who could link Mr. Tatman's aneurysm to the
accident was Dr. Cyril Wecht, who relied on Amico's testimony to reach
his conclusions. Wecht's testimony was struck by the court, and the opinion
does not mention why the testimony was struck. The court granted
defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The jury returned a verdict on
the survivor's claim, finding that Collins' actions were negligent, but that
the actions were not the proximate cause of the accident.
Mrs. Tatman appealed the district court's interpretation of Rule 32
and the subsequent exclusion of Amico's testimony to the Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit addressed both of the district court's reasons for
exclusion and overturned the district court's findings. First, the appellate
court explained that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not differentiate between depositions taken during discovery and depositions taken
for use at trial. Because no prior Fourth Circuit decisions had addressed
this issue, the court looked to other circuits for guidance and did not find
any support for treating discovery depositions differently from evidentiary
depositions. The court reasoned that the protective devices of crossexamination, objections and motions, are available to parties in both
discovery and evidentiary depositions. The court decided that when the
witness' deposition is duly noticed and all parties have the opportunity to
attend, the deposition is admissible at trial if the witness is unavailable
according to the criteria of Rule 32(a)(3)(B) and if the admission is also
permissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court held that the
identity of the party which initiated the deposition and the rationale for
taking the deposition are irrelevant. The Fourth Circuit noted that a
discovery deposition meeting the requirements of Rule 32(a)(3)(B) might
still be excluded in the court's discretion if it violates the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The Tatman holding is to apply solely to disputes over the
admission of depositions on the basis that they had been taken for
discovery, rather than evidentiary, reasons.
Next, the Fourth Circuit addressed the method of measuring the 100
mile radius under Rule 32(a)(3)(B). The Fourth Circuit held that for
purposes of applying the rule, the "place of trial" is the courthouse where
the trial takes place. The court explained that the policy behind the rule
is to ensure the convenience of the witness and the parties and that the
limit of convenience is measured by the 100 mile distance. The court
reasoned that measuring the distance from the borders of the district
would provide a variable standard of convenience, dependent upon factors
such as the size of the district and the location of the trial. The court
also compared the language of Rule 32(a)(3)(B) to other statutes in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court found that because other
rules specifically indicate that a distance is to be measured starting from
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the borders of the district, the use of the term "place of trial" in Rule
32(a)(3)(B) indicates a locus more definite that the district as a whole.
The court cited United States v. InternationalBusiness Machines Corp.,
90 F.R.D. 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) as support for this conclusion. The
IBM court had gone through a similar analysis and also had come to the
conclusion that "place of trial" was meant to indicate the courthouse.
The Fourth Circuit also looked to cases interpreting "place of trial" and
found several which use "place of trial" and "courthouse" interchangeably. Applying these findings to the facts of Tatman, the Fourth Circuit
held that because Dr. Amico was located more than 100 miles from the
courthouse and because the plaintiffs made no showing that Amico's
absence was procured by either party, Amico's deposition was not properly
excludable.
In his dissent, Judge Hall agreed with the majority's use of the
courthouse as the point from which the 100 mile radius should be measured
but disagreed with the admission of the deposition. While Judge Hall
admitted that there is no categorical exclusion of discovery depositions at
trial, he focused on the inherent weakness of the proof offered by Amico's
excluded testimony. Judge Hall stated that while Rule 32(a)(3)(B) permits
the introduction of the deposition, the rule does not require the introduction. Therefore, he would have found that the district court had not
abused its discretion in excluding the deposition and that its decision
should not be overturned.
The Tatman decision is consistent with the holdings of other circuits
addressing the same issues under Rule 32(a)(3)(B). 23 The Fourth Circuit's
clear interpretation of the application of Rule 32(a)(3)(B) helps simplify
an important procedural problem. Although the Fourth Circuit did not
break from the trend in other circuits in its interpretation of Rule 32(a)(3)(B),
Tatman clarifies the state of the law in this circuit.
The recently enacted Sentencing Reform Act (the "Act") is already a
source of judicial controversy and confusion. To interpret the Act's
numerous provisions courts have resorted to the plain language of the
statute and to the guidelines published by the United States Sentencing
Commission, Chapter 7, U.S.S.C. Guidelines Manual. Section 3565 of the
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3565 (1992), which provides for a defendant's resentencing upon revocation of probation due to violation of probation conditions, is the source of much confusion. The precise issue is whether the
language "any other sentence that was available under subchapter-A at

23. See Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., 941 F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir. 1991)
(stating that in application of Rule 32, courts no longer distinguish between depositions taken
for discovery use or for trial use); United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328, 1339 (3d Cir. 1989)
(describing Rule 32(a)(3)(B) as permitting deposition of witness who is more than 100 miles
from courthouse to be used as testimony); Starr v. J.Hacker Co., 688 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir.
1982) (applying Rule 32(a)(3)(B) and measuring 100 mile distance from courthouse).
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the time of the initial sentencing" 24 includes consideration of the postsentence conduct constituting the breach of probation. Only three federal
circuit courts have considered whether the statutory language restricts a
resentencing court to imposition of a sentence not exceeding the guideline
range applicable at the time of original sentencing or whether the resentencing court may consider the violation of the probation condition itself
as new criminal conduct calling for increased sentencing sanctions. 25 In
each of the circuit court cases, the court concluded that the Act's language
requires a sentencing court, resentencing after a probation violation, to
impose a sentence not exceeding the original guideline range.
In United States v. Alli, 929 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1991), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether the
court, upon revocation of probation, can resentence a defendant to a term
of active prison confinement in excess of the guideline range applicable
at the time of his initial sentencing. Hassan Mohammad Alli, Jr. ("Alli")
was sentenced to a three-year term of probation following a plea of guilty
to breaking into a United States Post Office building. At the time of
Alli's sentencing the guideline range was premised on a number of factors
according to the statutory scheme, including offense category level, criminal history, and mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The calculated
sentence range for Alli's offense was six to twelve months. The court
utilized its discretion under the guidelines and imposed conditional probation instead of a prison sentence. Under the probation conditions Alli
was to serve six months in a community treatment center and to refrain
from possession of any narcotic or controlled substance. Alli violated both
of these probation conditions and was returned to district court for a
hearing and resentencing. The District Court for the Middle District of
North Carolina revoked Alli's probation and sentenced him to a fifteen
month prison term and three years probation.
Alli appealed the district court's resentencing decision, arguing that
section 3565(a)(2) of the sentencing guidelines restricts the district court
from imposing a prison term upon revocation of probation beyond the
term applicable at the time of original sentencing. According to Alli, the
applicable imprisonment range under sections 3551-3559 for his Class D
felony was six to twelve months. Alli also argued that in testing positive
for cocaine he necessarily violated a mandatory condition of probation
under section 3563(a)(3), which makes abstention from possession of illegal

24. 18 U.S.C. § 3565(2) (1992).
25. See United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390, 391 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
that resentencing court must refer to applicable guideline range from initial sentencing hearing
when resentencing after violation of probation); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 136
(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that following revocation of probation court is required to impose
sentence that was available at time of original sentencing); United States v. Foster, 904 F.2d
20, 21 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that where imprisonment could not have been imposed on
defendant during initial sentencing it could not be imposed at resentence hearing).
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substances a mandatory condition of probation. When a defendant violates
this mandatory probation condition, the last sentence of section 3565(a)
requires revocation of probation and imposition of a sentence not less
than one-third of his original sentence. Thus, Alli argued that the sentence
statute required the court to impose no more than a one-year prison term.
The government argued that application of the initial guideline range
of six to twelve months would be inappropriate because this sentencing
range, determined at the initial sentence hearing, did not take into account
the criminal conduct constituting the later probation violation. Because
no guideline provision was in effect at the original sentencing to take into
consideration this conduct, the court must necessarily go back to the
section 3553 guideline calculations to impose an appropriate resentence
after probation revocation.
To resolve the issue the Fourth Circuit reviewed the express language
of the resentencing section and found the language to be unambiguous.
This section provides that upon revocation of probation the court should
"impose any other sentence that was available under subchapter-A at the
time of the initial sentencing." The court found this language to limit
resentencing after revocation of parole to a sentence that was available at
the time of the original sentence. Such sentence range would not include
the conduct causing the breach of probation.
The court also reviewed statements published by the Guideline Commission ("Commission") to assist courts when interpreting the Sentencing
Reform Act provisions. The court explained that the Commission's policy
statements supported a direct reading of the statute, as opposed to the
twisted reading the government proposed. The court noted that when
writing the Act the Commission had considered different approaches to
the sanctioning of defendants for violation of probation and supervised
release. According to the court, the Commission decided to treat the
violations as breaches of trust, rather than treating the probation violators'
conduct as new federal criminal conduct for sentencing purposes. Thus,
the court concluded that the goal of a revocation sentence was not to
punish violators for new criminal conduct.
However, the court was careful to note that the Commission acknowledged that the post-probation conduct could be considered in measuring
the extent of the breach of trust, and thus may weigh into a court's
resentencing decision, within the original guideline range. The court also
noted that the Commission's issuance of specific probation revocation
guidelines did not alter the Commission's or Congress' intent under section
3565 to apply the original guideline range following probation revocation.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the government's argument that a defendant's misconduct in violating his probation will go unpunished under this
reading of the statutory language. The court said that the post-sentencing
conduct is still relevant at the probation revocation proceeding to determine
precisely where within the original sentence range the defendant's prison
term should now, be set. In addition the court noted that a defendant
loses any time already spent in community confinement when he violates
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his probation and thus the appellant's violation of probation does not go
unpunished.
The court analyzed the case under the plain meaning of the Sentencing
Reform Act provision for resentencing. In Alli's situation the applicable
guideline range was six to twelve months. Thus, the court held that Alli
could be sentenced to a maximum of twelve months because this was the
maximum sentence applicable to him under the guidelines at the time of
his initial sentencing. Furthermore, Alli lost the 138 days he spent in
community confinement, but was entitled to 51 days credit against his
new sentence for time he spent in custody following his probation violation.
The court vacated the district court's sentence and remanded for resentencing according to this interpretation.
Judge Norton dissented claiming the majority's interpretation of the
statute was at odds with the Sentencing Reform Act taken as a wholes
has no support in the legislative history, and produces anomalous results.
He argued that the most straightforward reading of the statutory language
does not compel the majority's conclusion that section 3565 means any
other sentence within the original guideline range: He stated that the
majority did not interpret the statutory words according to their plain
meaning, but read into them an additional limitation not evident in the
words themselves. Judge Norton interprets the statutory language "any
other sentence" to refer to any sentence up to the statutory maximum
under subchapter-A which may now be different due to the post-sentencing
conduct, as opposed to any sentence available under the original guideline
sentence.
Because the Sentencing Reform Act is a relatively new piece of
legislation, only three other circuit courts have faced the issue at hand. 26
The Fourth Circuit's decision in this case is consistent with the three other
appellate court interpretations. Each circuit court ultimately concluded
that the clear language of 3565(a)(2) controls, and requires that upon
resentencing following revocation of probation the resentencing court is
limited to a sentence within the guideline range determined at the time of
original sentencing.
Controversy has long surrounded the application of state-created privileges in federal criminal cases. One dispute focuses on the admissibility
of evidence that state criminal law prohibits but that federal law allows.
Federal Rule of Evidence 501 (Rule 501) provides for the incorporation

26. See United States v. Von Washington, 915 F.2d 390, 391 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding
that resentencing court must refer to applicable guideline range from initial sentencing hearing
when resentencing after violation of probation); United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 133, 136

(11th Cir. 1990) (holding that following revocation of probation court is required to impose
sentence that was available at time of original sentencing); United States v. Foster, 904 F.2d
20, 21 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that where imprisonment could not have been imposed on
defendant during initial sentencing it could not be imposed at resentence hearing).
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of common law privilege doctrines in federal cases. However, Rule 501
also provides for state law to determine the applicability of an evidentiary
privilege in those actions where state law supplies the rule of decision with

respect to an element of a claim or defense. Under Rule 501, courts must
first determine whether the state law privilege is in conflict with common
law evidentiary rules. 27 If the state law privilege is indeed in conflict with
the common law, the courts must then balance the underlying considerations of the state law with the interests underlying the federal law and
2
determine which law should apply.

In United States v. Cartledge, 928 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1991), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit applied a Rule 501 balancing
test to determine the applicability of a North Carolina state law privilege

in a federal criminal case. In Cartledge, the court considered whether the
Federal District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina erred in
suppressing evidence, in accordance with North- Carolina General Statute
section 20-135.2A(d), of an alleged seat belt violation. Section 20-135.2A(d)
prohibits the introduction of evidence of a seat belt violation in all criminal
and civil trials except those based upon the accused's infraction of the
seat belt law itself.
On October 11, 1989, the defendant, Larry Cartledge (Cartledge),
drove his 1984 Chevrolet Corvette north on Interstate 85. The Corvette

had dark, tinted windows. Cartledge passed Highway Patrolman A.C.
Combs' (Combs) patrol car parked in the median on Interstate 85. Cartledge was not speeding at the time he passed Combs' parked patrol car.

Combs noticed the tinted windows on Cartledge's Corvette as the
vehicle passed the patrol car. Combs testified that he could not see whether

the driver of the Corvette wore a seat belt. Combs pursued the Corvette
and directed Cartledge to stop the car. After Cartledge showed Combs his

driver's license and car registration, Combs cited Cartledge for driving

27. See Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) (concluding
question of whether party may assert state-created evidentiary privilege rests upon principles
of common law); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 371-73 (1980) (holding judicially
created evidentiary privilege for state legislators not comparable to federal Speech or Debate
Clause designed to protect federal legislators); United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1372
(2d Cir. 1978) (ruling state-created privileges not controlling in federal criminal cases except
to extent state privileges reflect common law); In re Prod. of Records to the Grand Jury, 618
F. Supp. 440, 442 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding Massachusetts law prohibiting release of certain
medical records in conflict with federal common law).
28. See Gillock, 445 U.S. at 373 (concludinig federal law must override state law in cases
involving important federal interests, such as enforcement of federal criminal statutes); Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1372-73 (ruling that strong federal policy favoring admissibility of evidence
in criminal cases outweighed state's interest in providing evidentiary privilege for statements
made in applying for unemployment benefits); Memorial Hosp., 664 F.2d at 1061 (concluding
that federal courts should consider and weigh importance of state-created privilege in determining whether federal law or state law should apply in particular case); Grand Jury, 618 F.
Supp. at 442 (holding that Rule 501 requires court to consider both federal and state interests
and balance federal interests against underlying purposes of state evidentiary privilege).
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without a seat belt in violation of North Carolina General Statute section
20-135.2A(a).
Combs then asked if Cartledge was in possession of any alcohol or
firearms. Cartledge told Combs that a gun was in the console of the
Corvette. Combs searched the Corvette and found a handgun in the console
and over $20,000 in cash in a grocery bag under a speaker in the back
seat. Combs also searched Cartledge and Cartledge's passenger. Combs
discovered over $3,000 in cash in Cartledge's pockets and a pocket knife
in the passenger's possession. At some point during Combs' search,
Cartledge signed a consent-to-search form. A drug detection dog detected
the scent of drugs on the bag of money hidden in the back seat. However,
the police found no drugs in the car.
In addition to the seat belt citation, officers charged Cartledge with
carrying a concealed weapon in violation of North Carolina law. The
prosecutor later dismissed both the seat belt citation and the weapons
charge and charged Cartledge in federal court with possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a).
Cartledge moved prior to trial to suppress evidence of the seat belt
violation, alleging that Combs had no probable cause to stop Cartledge's
vehicle because Combs could not tell whether Cartledge wore a seat belt
through the tinted windows of the Corvette.
The district court granted Cartledge's motion to suppress evidence of
the seat belt violation. The court prohibited evidence of the defendant's
failure to wear a seat belt under North Carolina General Statute section
20-135.2A(d), which excludes such evidence in cases where the defendant
did not come to trial for violation of the seat belt law. In its initial order,
the district court also found that Combs' stop of Cartledge's vehicle was
pretextual. However, the district court later issued findings of fact and
conclusions of law stating that the court did not reach the merits of the
probable cause issue in deciding to suppress evidence of Cartledge's seat
belt violation.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the district court's conclusions, holding
that the district court failed to balance competing federal and state interests
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) and Rule 501. Rule 104(a)
states that the court should determine any preliminary questions concerning
witness qualification, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence. Rule 104(a) also provides that the rules of evidence do not bind
the court except with regard to privileges. Rule 501 requires a court to
follow state-created evidentiary privileges only when the state law is
synonymous with the common law or when state interests in upholding
the privilege outweigh federal interests.
The Fourth Circuit at the outset considered the possibility that North
Carolina General Statute section 20-135.2A(d) failed to create the type of
privilege contemplated under Rule 501. The court, however, did not resolve
that issue. The court instead concentrated on the issue of whether state
or federal criminal law should apply in Cartledge's case, even if a privilege
did in fact exist under North Carolina law.
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The Fourth Circuit then examined prior case law to determine the
applicability of the North Carolina evidentiary privilege in Cartledge's
federal criminal case. The court first considered the decision reached in
United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360 (1980). In Gillock, the defendant
asserted that a Tennessee statute created an evidentiary privilege for state
legislative speech and debate. The United States Supreme Court in Gillock
ruled that Tennessee's evidentiary privilege for state legislators did not
coincide with federal common law privilege, even though an evidentiary
privilege existed for federal legislators. The Court then balanced the
competing federal and state interests regarding evidentiary privilege for
legislative speech and debate. The Court concluded that the federal interest
in enforcing criminal statutes outweighed Tennessee's state policy considerations. Thus, the Supreme Court applied federal law in Gillock.
The Fourth Circuit also relied on three cases from other federal circuit
courts that balanced competing federal and state interests in evidentiary
matters. In United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978),
Vincent Chiarella (Chiarella) allegedly used confidential information to
purchase and sell tender offers at a substantial profit. A jury convicted
Chiarella of violating section 10(b) and Rule lob-5 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. Among his other arguments on appeal, Chiarella
contended that the lower court wrongfully admitted into evidence a statement in which Chiarella admitted he left his prior job as a result of
misusing confidential information. Chiarella made the statement when
applying for unemployment benefits, and a New York labor law provided
for exclusion of such statements. As in the Gillock case, the court weighed
the interests of the state against federal interests. The Chiarella court
concluded that the federal policy favoring admissibility of evidence in
criminal cases outweighed the policy considerations of the New York
evidentiary privilege.
The Fourth Circuit noted that similar conclusions resulting from the
balancing of federal and state interests to determine the applicability of
state-created privileges appear in Memorial Hospital v. Shadur, 664 F.2d
1058, 1061 (7th Cir. 1981) and In re Production of Records to the Grand
Jury, 618 F. Supp. 440, 442 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1985), both cited in Cartledge.
The Memorial Hospital court and the Grand Jury court agreed that, under
Rule 501, federal common law principles govern recognition of an evidentiary privilege. The courts also held that the trier of fact must balance
federal and state interests and apply state law only when that law does
not interfere substantially with federal policy interests.
After reviewing case law establishing the balancing test used to determine the applicability of state and federal law privileges, the Fourth
Circuit in Cartledge balanced the competing state and federal policies that
the North Carolina privilege excluding evidence of seat belt violations in
particular cases implicated. The court found that the federal interest in
enforcing federal criminal statutes outweighed any state interest connected
with North Carolina General Statute section 20-135.2A(d). The Fourth
Circuit thus reversed the district court's suppression of Cartledge's seat

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:753

belt infraction. However, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for retrial
at the district court level to determine whether evidence of the seat belt
violation was nevertheless inadmissible on grounds that Combs' stop of
Cartledge's vehicle was pretextual and failed to establish probable cause.
The decision of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Cartledgeis consistent with prior case law at the Supreme Court, appellate
court and district court levels. As illustrated in the Supreme Court's
decision in Gillock and in the other federal cases which the Fourth Circuit
discusses in Cartledge, a strong federal .policy exists favoring the introduction of all relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding. Therefore, the
Cartledge court's ruling that the federal interest in enforcing a criminal
statute outweighs any interest of the state of North Carolina in excluding
evidence of seat belt violations brings the Fourth Circuit in accord with
the holdings of other circuits.
Section 5kl.1 of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)
(effective Nov. 1, 1987; amended effective Nov. 1, 1989), provides that
federal courts do not have the power to impose, sua sponte, a lower
sentence than is statutorily required. Under the Sentencing Guidelines; a
sentencing court can depart downward from the applicable statutory guideline range only upon a motion from the government requesting a downward
departure. In light of section 5kl's "downward departure" provision,
sentencing courts generally refuse to depart downward from the applicable
guideline range absent a formal request by the government for a downward
departure-even when the defendant substantially cooperates with law
enforcement officials. 29 Against this background, the Fourth Circuit, in
United States v. Daniels, 929 F.2d 128 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
201 (1991), considered, inter alia, whether the district court erred in
refusing to order specific performance of an informal plea agreement.
Daniels was charged with possession and conspiracy to distribute
"substantial amounts" of crack cocaine. Daniels pleaded guilty to one
count which charged him with possession of crack cocaine with intent to
29. See United States v. La Guardia, 902 F.2d 1010, 1018 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding nothing
improper with government's decision to forego departure motion notwithstanding defendant's
substantial cooperation with government); United States v. Reina, 905 F.2d 638, 640-41 (2d
Cir. 1990) (holding district court could not depart downward from Sentencing Guidelines range
on basis of defendant's substantial assistance in prosecution of another defendant absent
motion for downward departure from government). But see United States v. Roberts, 726 F.
Supp. 1359, 1375-76 (D.C. 1989) (holding district court has authority to consider defendant's
cooperation with law enforcement officials for limited sentencing purposes), reversed, United
States v. Mills, 925 F.2d 455 (4th Cir.), vacated rehearing en banc granted sub nom. United
States v. Mills, 933 F.2d 1042 (D.C. Cir.), reversed sub nom. United States v. Doe, 934 F.2d
353 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 268 (1991). The Roberts court explained that district
courts may inquire as to whether a defendant has provided the prosecution with substantial
assistance in determining whether prosecution's decision not to request a downward departure
was arbitrary. Id. at 1375. The Roberts court also noted that the district court may inquire
as to whether the procedures leading to the government's decision not to file a motion for a
downward departure were not unfair despite Sentencing Guidelines provision permitting departure from guidelines for substantial assistance only upon prosecution's motion. Id. at 1376.
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distribute. Daniels was sentenced in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of West Virginia. Because of Daniels's juvenile
criminal record, the district court found the criminal history category III
of the Sentencing Guidelines applicable. Consequently, the district court
sentenced Daniels to 188 months, the minimum possible sentence under
the applicable guideline range. Daniels appealed his sentence to the Fourth
Circuit alleging, inter alia, that the district court improperly refused to
order specific performance of an alleged informal plea agreement between
Daniels and a police detective. Daniels alleged that subsequent to his
arrest, but before counsel was appointed, a police detective told him that
"if [Daniels] cooperated in capturing [his] other codefendants and clearing
this matter up, that [the police] would see to it that [Daniels] got a lot
less time or something to that effect." The police detective recalled the
conversation, but testified that he merely promised Daniels that if Daniels
cooperated with the police, the police would "advise the authorities of
the extent of [Daniels's] cooperation." Daniels did in fact assist the police
in capturing one of his codefendants.
More than two months after Daniels was arrested, Daniels, with the
advice of counsel, entered into a plea agreement with the government
under which Daniels agreed to plea guilty to one count of a four count
indictment. Under this agreement Daniels also agreed to cooperate further
with the police regarding the prosecutions of his codefendants. In return,
the government promised to dismiss the remaining three counts of the
indictment. Under the agreement the government also informed Daniels
that his sentence would not be less than ten years and not more than life.
Daniels and his counsel, at a Rule 11 hearing before the district court,
testified that the plea agreement was the sole agreement with the government. However, at sentencing, Daniels requested a downward departure
from the sentencing guidelines based on the police detective's informal
promise. The district court refused to consider the informal promise
because of Daniels's prior testimony that the written plea agreement with
the government was the only agreement with the government.
The Fourth Circuit found that the district court's refusal to consider
a downward departure was not clearly erroneous under the standard
enunciated in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985). Anderson
requires reviewing courts to afford trial courts substantial deference regarding findings of fact. The Fourth Circuit noted that the government
never promised to file a motion for a downward departure because of
Daniels's cooperation with the police. The Fourth Circuit further noted
that the district court, at Daniels's Rule 11 hearing, inquired sufficiently
into the possible existence of additional plea agreements. The Fourth
Circuit explained that even if Daniels had argued at his Rule 11 hearing
that there was an additional unwritten plea agreement between Daniels
and the government, Daniels would not be entitled to a downward departure. According to the Fourth Circuit, unless there is an agreement
requiring the government to file a motion for a downward departure, a
defendant has no right to demand that one be filed. In Daniels's case the
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informal statement of the police detective did not amount to a promise
to file a motion of a downward departure as required under section 5kl
of the Sentencing Guidelines. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed
Daniels's sentence.
The Fourth Circuit's strict interpretation of the "plea agreement"
provision in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in this case is in accord
with the holdings of other circuits that have recently considered the issue.A0
The United States Supreme Court denied certiori. 31
Prior to 1987, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), allowed, but did not require, a sentencing
judge to consider the falsity of a convicted defendant's testimony in
passing sentence. Section 3C1.1 of the United States' Sentencing Commission Guidelines, 18 U.S.C. App. 4 (Supp. 1991) (Sentencing Guidelines), now requires a judge to increase the sentencing level of a convicted
defendant by two levels for "obstruction of justice." The Sentencing
Guidelines Commentary defines obstruction of justice to include committing or suborning perjury. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt., note l(c) (Nov. 1989);
id., cmt., note 3(b) (Nov. 1990). The Application Notes to the Sentencing
Guidelines provide,
This provision is not intended to punish a defendant for the
exercise of a constitutional right [e.g., the right to testify on his
own behalf, to the due process of being charged with the crime
of perjury prior to being punished for it, etc.]. A defendant's
denial of guilt is not a basis for application of this provision ....
[S]uspect testimony and statements should be evaluated in a light
32
most favorable to the defendant.

30. See United States v. Poston, 902 F.2d 90, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding police
officer's general promise to reward defendant's cooperation by informing prosecution of
cooperation did not obligate prosecution to file motion for downward departure from federal
sentencing guidelines); United States v. Coleman, 895 F.2d 501, 504 (8th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
that absent express promise by government to file motion for downward departure from
mandatory minimum sentence, plea agreement is unambiguous and cannot bind government
to file such motion); cf. United States v. Alamin, 895 F.2d 1335, 1337 (11th Cir.) (explaining
that district court may not depart from sentencing guidelines based on substantial assistance
furnished by defendant absent motion by government requesting departure), reh'g denied, 904
F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Ortez, 902 F.2d 61, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (finding
district court did not have power to depart from applicable Sentencing Guidelines on basis of
defendant's substantial cooperation with law enforcement authorities without government
motion affirming defendant's cooperation); United States v. Dobynes, 905 F.2d 1192, 1197
(8th Cir. 1990) (explaining that, despite defendant's cooperation, under Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, court has no authority to even consider downward departure unless government
makes motion for reduction).
31. Daniels v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 201 (1991).
32. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.I, appl. notes 2 & 3 (Nov. 1989). This version of the Application
Notes applied at the time the district court tried, convicted and sentenced Dunnigan. United
States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 1991). Effective November 1, 1990, new

19921

FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

781

Prior to August 30, 1991, all of the courts of appeal that encountered the
issue of the constitutionality of the optional sentencing enhancement for
33
obstruction of justice upheld the provision.
In United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), a court
of appeals refused, for the first time, to accept the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Guidelines' increase of a convicted defendant's sentence
for falsely testifying at his own trial. In addition to the sentencing
guidelines issue in Dunnigan, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit also considered the district court's denial of a motion to
dismiss for an insufficiently specific indictment and the lack of a bill of
particulars. Further, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's allowance of "similar acts" evidence and the effect the government's failure
to provide exculpatory evidence as mandated by Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963).
In Dunnigan, the grand jury indicted the defendant on a charge of
conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The defendant filed pretrial motions to
dismiss the indictment, for a bill of particulars, and for disclosure of
exculpatory and Jencks Act material. At the hearing on the motions, the
government agreed to provide Jencks Act material, notice of "similar
acts" evidence, and information regarding any confidential informants.
The defendant withdrew her motion for a bill of particulars and the United
States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia denied the
motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of specificity.
The government presented five witnesses at trial that testified regarding
Dunnigan's involvement in the cocaine distribution conspiracy. Defendant
objected to the lack of pretrial Brady discovery concerning a government
witness's undisclosed schizophrenic condition that could affect the witness's
credibility. While the defendant did not object to "similar acts" evidence
given by the government in its case-in-chief, the district court, sua sponte,
gave a "similar acts" instruction to the jury. According to the district
court's instruction, the jury could consider the defendant's daughter's
preparation of crack only if the jury believed such preparation constituted
Application Note 1 combines the substance of former Application Notes 2 and 3:
This provision is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right. A defendant's denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath
that constitutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or provide information to a probation
officer, or refusal to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis for application of this
provision. In applying this provision, the defendant's testimony and statements
should be evaluated in a light most favorable to the defendant.
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, appl. note 1 (Nov. 1990).
33. See United States v. Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that
optional sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice is constitutional); United States v.
Matos, 907 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366,
1369 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, IlI S. Ct. 394 (1990); United States v. Wallace, 904 F.2d
603, 604-05 (lth Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983, 988 (10th Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 160 (1990); United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945,
953 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 255 (1989).
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part of the cocaine distribution conspiracy charged. If the jury did not
believe the crack preparation constituted part of the cocaine distribution
conspiracy, the jury could only consider the crack preparation evidence
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) for motive, intent, preparation,
lack of mistake, and knowledge of the crime charged.
Dunnigan's defense consisted of a complete denial of all involvement
with the cocaine conspiracy. The jury, however, returned a verdict of
guilty. In determining sentence, the district court increased the sentencing
level by two levels due to "obstruction of justice," based on the court's
finding that the defendant testified falsely at her trial.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit first found the indictment sufficiently
specific and upheld the district court's denial of the defendant's motion
to dismiss. Second, the court found that the defendant waived her right
to a bill of particulars by withdrawing her request for the bill at the
pretrial hearing. Third, the Fourth Circuit held that in light of the
defendant's failure to object and the district court's limiting instructions,
the admission of the "similar acts" testimony did not constitute clear
error. Fourth, because Dunnigan did not object to the testimony of the
schizophrenic witness and the jury heard that the witness suffered from
the condition, the Fourth Circuit held that only harmless error resulted
from this Brady violation and affirmed the district court's conviction of
Dunnigan.
The Fourth Circuit took issue, however, with the constitutionality of
the "obstruction of justice" enhancement provided by the Sentencing
Guidelines which the district court used to increase Dunnigan's sentence.
The Dunnigan court stated that the Sentencing Guidelines removed the
rationale for allowing optional consideration of false testimony provided
for in Grayson. The Supreme Court stated in Grayson that allowing
sentencing judges to consider the falsity of a convicted defendant's testimony did not require the judges to enhance the sentences of all defendants
in some "wooden or reflex fashion." The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
the Supreme Court decided Grayson prior to the issuance of the Sentencing
Guidelines at a time when sentencing judges had very broad discretion in
determining which factors to consider in passing sentence. The Fourth
Circuit surmised that no automatic sentence inflator existed in Grayson
because of the uncertainty of whether the sentencing judge would exercise
his broad discretion to consider the falsity of a defendant's testimony. On
the contrary, by explicitly requiring consideration of "obstruction of
justice," the Sentencing Guidelines provide just the wooden or reflex
enhancement disclaimed by the Supreme Court.
The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the required consideration of the
convicted defendant's apparently false testimony, when weighed with other
factors in the trial process, places too heavy a burden on a defendant's
right to testify on his own behalf. According to the court, a defendant
who goes to trial has already given up the chance of a lesser sentence
through plea bargaining. Further, if the defendant chooses to testify, he
runs the risk that the prosecution will impeach the credibility of his
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testimony on cross-examination. The court indicated, however, that a
defendant runs a greater risk of conviction if he does not testify than if
he does. Thus, during the trial, the defendant must choose between not
testifying, with a heavy risk of conviction, and testifying on pain of facing
an enhanced sentence.
The Dunnigan court indicated a lack of satisfaction with the amount
of safeguards in place to prevent this enhancement from unfairly coercing
a defendant, guilty or innocent, into not testifying in his own behalf. The
Fourth Circuit dismissed the usefulness of the clearly erroneous standard
of review in "obstruction of justice" findings. The court reasoned that
an appellate court will never rule the district court's finding of guilt clearly
erroneous if the higher court upholds the verdict. Alternatively, if the
appellate court overturns the guilty verdict, the false testimony issue
becomes moot.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit cautioned that the blind following of jury
verdicts as the touchstone of perjury may result in an unfairness to the
defendant. The court reasoned that neither judges nor jurors can produce
infallible findings one hundred percent of the time. Because the Fourth
Circuit viewed the rigidity of the Sentencing Guidelines as making the
obstruction of justice enhancement an intolerable burden upon the defendant's right to testify on his own behalf, the court vacated Dunnigan's
sentence and remanded to the district court for resentencing without an
"obstruction of justice" enhancement.
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Dunnigan creates a split with the
several other courts of appeal that have ruled on the constitutional validity
of the Sentencing Guidelines' enhancement feature for the implied finding
of perjury where a convicted defendant testified on his own behalf. In
fact, four judges on the Fourth Circuit joined in a dissent to the court's
decision when the full court voted to deny a rehearing en banc on the
sentencing enhancement issue.3 4 The other courts of appeal based their
upholding of the enhancement feature on the premise that a defendant's
right to self-testimony should not create a constitutional license to commit
perjury. In United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 394 (1990), and United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d
1537, 1539 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3252 (1990), the courts of
appeal explicitly stated that the Sentencing Guidelines did not change the
Supreme Court's analysis in Grayson. Indeed, the enhancement for false
testimony technically remains a nonautomatic sentence inflator due to the
considerations of various factors provided for in the Sentencing Guidelines
Commentary. The Fourth Circuit has raised the important issue, however,
of whether the application, rather than the language, of the Sentencing
Guidelines results in an automatic sentence enhancement. Without specifying what further safeguards the Sentencing Guidelines would need to

34. United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir.), reh'g denied by an equally
divided court, 950 F.2d 149 (4th Cir. 1991) (Wilkins, J., dissenting).
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incorporate to avoid an undue burden on the defendant's decision to
testify, the Fourth Circuit challenged the integrity of the guideline system.
While statistical studies on the proportion of convicted defendants who
receive sentencing enhancement for "obstruction of justice" may shed
light on the flexibility of the Sentencing Guidelines, only the Supreme
Court can resolve this fissure in the courts of appeals' views on theory
for the system and reality for the defendant.
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court took
a major step toward eliminating racial discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges. Previously, a criminal defendant had to show a
systematic exclusion of black jurors through prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges over a period of time to demonstrate an equal protection
violation.35 The Batson Court found that this standard was too burdensome
for defendants, and held that the prosecutor's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges in a single case could establish an equal protection
violation. In order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, Batson held that a defendant must show that "he is a member
of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's
race." 3 6 According to the Batson Court, the trial court should consider
all relevant circumstances in deciding whether a defendant has established
the prima facie case. Once the prima facie case is shown, Batson held
that the burden shifts to the government to provide a racially neutral
explanation for the use of the peremptory challenge.
Batson made sweeping changes, but offered courts little guidance as
to implementation. Because courts were willing to find the prima facie
violation, most courts focused primarily upon the legitimacy of the proffered explanations. However, the courts established no clear boundaries
as to what factors were important in establishing a prima facie case.
In United States v. Joe, 928 F.2d 99 (4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth
Circuit clarified how lower courts should evaluate the prima facie case of
discrimination in peremptory challenges. In Joe, two of the defendants
were black and one was white. The government used six of its eight
peremptory challenges to excuse black members of the venire. The final
jury included five black members. The defendants moved to dismiss the
jury prior to trial on the grounds that the prosecution had used its
peremptory challenges in a discriminatory manner. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia summarily denied the
motion, but required the government to meet with a court reporter the
day after the jury selection and dictate its reasons for striking the six
black jurors. This dictation occurred outside the presence of the court and

35. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 (1965) (stating burden of proof required
to show equal protection violation due to systematic exclusion of black jurors).
36. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
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the defendants. The district court did not examine the government's
reasons, but sealed the record containing them.
At the conclusion of the trial, the defendants renewed their Batson
challenge. The district court did not rule on whether the defendants had
established a prima facie case under Batson, or whether the government's
reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges were racially neutral. The
district court did allow the defendants to examine the government's reasons
and present their arguments for the record. The district court then affirmed
its earlier denial of the defendants' motion on the grounds that because
some blacks had served on the final jury, no Batson violation could occur.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision as to the
white defendant, but reversed and remanded as to the two black defendants. The Joe court stated that although the presence of members of
defendants' race on the jury should receive substantial consideration and
might weigh against a finding of discrimination, that fact alone does not
automatically preclude the defendants from establishing a prima facie
Batson case. The Fourth Circuit emphasized that even if the prosecution
strikes only one black juror for a discriminatory reason, then the defendant's equal protection rights are violated, no matter how many blacks
serve on the final jury and no matter if the government articulates valid
reasons for striking all other black venirepersons.
The Fourth Circuit also criticized the district court's evaluation of the
defendants' Batson claim. The Joe court said that because the digtrict
court allowed the government to state its reasons for exercising its peremptory challenges outside the district court's presence, the district court
was unable to evaluate the credibility of the prosecutor. The Fourth Circuit
also held that the district court had erred by delaying the Batson hearing
until after the trial. The Joe court stated that the district court should
have held the hearing during the jury selection process, when the district
court could have cured any violations. After trial, the only remedy for a
Batson violation is a new trial, which wastes valuable judicial resources.
Finally, the Joe court held that the district court had erred by not ruling
at each step of the Batson analysis, forcing the Joe court to infer factual
findings and reasons for the dismissal of the claim.
The Fourth Circuit then established the preferred procedure for handling Batson challenges. First, the trial court must determine whether a
defendant initially has made out a prima facie Batson violation. If a
defendant can establish a prima facie case, then the trial court must
require the government to articulate its reasons for using its peremptory
challenges. The trial court must then determine whether the proffered
reasons are facially neutral. If the trial court finds that the government's
reasons are facially neutral, then the trial court must allow the defendant
an opportunity to show that the facially neutral explanation is merely a
pretext for discrimination. Finally, the trial court must issue a specific
ruling on each juror in question, supported by its findings of fact and its
rationale for the ruling. The Fourth Circuit refused to review the reasons
offered by the government in the district court proceedings. Noting that

